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Kas Kalba 
The Cable Fable 
When Henry Ford announced in 1910 a "business 
strategy of volume production of a static-model, reliable 
car for the masses," he was not stepping into a 
commercial void. Through magazine articles, races, auto 
shows, demand for the self-powered covered wagon had 
already grown to the point of mass appreciation. It was, 
after all, not difficult to persuade a restless, turn-of-the-
century public that the motor car would keep the city 
streets cleaner than the horse; that it was quieter and 
more manageable, and less likely to spread tetanus; that 
it provided increased mobility and status and initiated 
the opening up of sul)urban lands. 
In short, the early myth of the automobile not only 
gave us rapid access to combustion on wheels, ultimately 
it also gave us the mass automobile, massive traffic jams 
and mass pollution of today-all because demand and 
supply came together very rapidly and on a large scale. 
Had demand been longer in the coming, some of the 
longer-term negative effects of the motor car might have 
been more easily controlled. Both the development of 
alternative vehicles as well as consideration of alternate 
forms of transport would have been possible. 
Currently another myth of technological betterment is 
in the making. The transportation revolution, this myth 
contends, will soon be superceded by a communications 
revolution, which once again will transform society, 
economy and culture. Telecommunications systems will 
thrill our egos, guard our homes, and cook our meals. 
This myth, unlike its motorized counterpart, is not as 
dependant on a single product or technology; nonethe-
less, its focus clearly falls on cable television. It is this 
new video mode that has instigated a battle for control, 
which, in the words of Ralph Lee Smith, is "deadlier 
than a western." At the same time., the potential and 
promise of cable television are being extolled by a wide 
range of normally divergent voices. It is hardly 
exaggeration to speak of an emerging cable "fable." 
A Cable for Every Lot 
The merits of cable television have, of course, been 
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propounded by cable system operators-the Ma and Pa's, 
as they have been called-for over two decades, and even 
the usually broadcaster-protective federal regulatory 
structure has started to pay heed to the message. 
However, it was not until publication this past December 
of the final report of the Sloan Commission on Cable 
Communications that the cable fable gained the sanction 
of official imprimatur. 
Entitled {)n the Cable: The Television of Abundance, 
the Sloan report arrives at two principal conclusions. 
First, state Kermit Gordon (Brookings), Jerome Weisner 
(M.l.T.), Henry Rowan (Rand), Ivan Allen (Atlanta), 
and a dozen other commissioners, it is "in the public 
interest to encourage the growth of cable television." 
And by "public interest" these men (and one woman; 
added to the Commission belatedly) mean not so much 
what Ralph Nader means-or what· Black Efforts for 
Soul in Television or Action for Children's Television 
mean-but, more likely, what a successor of Alfred P. 
Sloan meant when he contended that what is good for 
GM is good for the nation. Cable television, in other 
words, will make America grow. 
Moreover, not only is cable good for America, it is 
here to stay. This supporting notion is embedded in the 
Sloan Commission's second major conclusion. "The 
Commission believes," the report reads, "that by the end 
of the decade a cable television system will be in 
existence which covers 40 to 60 percent of all American 
television homes." Given the fact that television homes 
account for 95% of all homes, this is a staggering 
projection. 
Unfortunately, it is also a projection that the National 
Cable Television Association abandoned about a year 
ago as too bullish to be even good P.R. It presumes that 
in less than half the time it has taken to hook up current 
cable TV households (roughly 9% of total) an additional 
four or five times as many subscribers will be found and 
serviced-a highly unlikely event. Even Vancouver, 
British Columbia, which over the past decade has 
managed to accumulate more cable television subscribers 
than any other city in the world has not experienced 
such a growth rate. 
On the other hand, there may be a broader truth to 
the Commission's prognostic salesmanship. If cable 
television achieves only 20 or 25% penetration by 1980, 
this will still be enough to indicate that the medium is 
not simply a freakish variation of wireless TV. Whatever 
its precise growth rate, cable television ten years from 
now will no longer be centered in locales of dire 
necessity such as the hills of Oregon and Pennsylvania 
where the technology got its start. In those early days 
(circa 1948), operating under the pseudonym of CA TV 
(for Community Antenna Television), the cable was a 
media St. Bernard bringing three or four live, pulsating 
signals to hidden nooks where before-due to distance or 
topography-none could be received. By the end of the 
decade cable television will be an electronic turnpike. 
But growth, it should be added, is not assured merely 
by the capacity to grow. There must be something to fill 
that capacity. In Canada, where cable television has 
generally grown rapidly, the capacity has been filled by a 
widespread demand for clearer reception of more and 
more U.S. channels (the cultural effect of which has 
started to worry the Canadian government). What will 
our domestic cable bring us? More and clearer I Love 
Lucy, Bonanza, Dr. Welby and Spiro Agnew? Even the 
· waxers of the TV dream machine do not put such faith 
in the American household's desire to spend $5, $10, 
$15 extra each month for such programming once Phase 
II subsides. 
Tale of a Thousand Channels 
It is here that the Tale of a Thousand and One 
Channels begins (with touches ofSeuss'sMulberryStreet 
and Bradbury's Illustrated Man). Cable television, the 
promotors claim, will bring opera to Odessa, Broadway 
to Bayonne, adult education to Appalachia, "soul" to 
Watts and Bedford Stuyvesant, and sports-megahertz 
upon megahertz of sports-to superspectators wherever 
they are. The "television of abundance" will be a 
medium of joy as well as the "soap box" of our 
discontent. And the cable will also provide us with a 
mind-boggling roster of electronic services, from home 
burglary alarms and political polling to remote shopping 
and newspaper delivery by facsimile. (The facsimile 
machine will deplete Redwood Forest by the third 
Sunday. Unless, that is, the cable also brings us a paper 
recycling terminal and/or electronic storage, which is not 
inconceivable.) 
Naturally enough, the philosophical principal most 
often raised by the proponents of cable television is 
diversity, a half-defined idea that has stumped national 
communications policy time and time again. Yet cable 
television, we ar.e told, will be able to do what UHF 
stations, public broadcasting, network documentaries, 
local specials, amateur hours and even Dick Cavett have 
not been able to do, namely increase the content variety 
and break down the audience scale of television 
programming. Tropical fish hobbyists, karate enthu-
siasts, cerebral palsy victims, and retired musicians will 
each find a niche in the coaxial honeycomb. For cable 
television will be to network television what newsletters, 
community newspapers and specialty magazines are to 
Life, Readers Digest or Playboy. 
The difficulty with this vision is that too often it 
obscures the conditions essential to its realization. To 
begin with, barring the quick introduction of wave-guide 
or laser technology, we are not going to have 100 !-
channel television; nor 200- or 100- or even SO-channel 
television in the foreseeable future. While it is true that 
one or two existing cable systems possess a latent 
capacity of about 60 channels, most new installations 
are choosing to remain within a 20 or 25 channel 
capacity limit. For greater capacity, system operators 
would have to fight channel interference or add second 
cables, which are not marginal undertakings. 
The vision also obscures the fact that relatively few of 
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the new programming opportunities will be commerci-
ally viable (even with pay television). Add this to the 
practical limits on channel capacity, and one is left with 
programming alternatives on the order of adult movies 
(broadly defined), home alarms, special sports events, 
and· perhaps a single, all-encompasing "cultural" channel 
(with Ed Sullivan rotating with Sol Hurok as guest 
hosts), but not library retrieval, consumer information, 
or neighborhood news and politics. Nor are the various 
non-commercial, institutional applications of cable 
television (e.g. communications support of health 
clinics) likely to find room on moderate-capacity 
systems oriented toward home billing. 
Regulation could, of course, induce certain services 
that would not otherwise be available. For example,in 
Manhattan the two locally-franchised cable systems are 
required to "sub-district" their service areas in order to 
facilitate the production and reception of neighbor-
hood-oriented programming. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission, however, has not imposed a parallel 
requirement on other cable systems, despite a recent 
chance to do so. Similarly, a Public Dividend Plan, which 
would have provided funding for local cable program- · 
ming (through a 5% gross receipts tax on cable systems) 
was only momentarily espoused by the FCC and has 
now been entirely jettisoned. · 
Beauty and the Beast 
Not everyone, however, is dismayed by the FCC's 
failure to adopt a Public Dividend Plan or variation 
thereof. Again, there are the growth proponents, who 
see the imposition of any tax or fee on cable television 
returns as a threat to industry survival. Cable television, 
they say, will do great things, but first, and above all, it 
must be allowed to grow. Unless the medium can spin its 
web of dollar-generating services such as sports and 
movies, the logic continues, the futuristic paraphernelia 
of the wired national will never appear. And it is only 
after sizeable penetration into the nation's households 
has occurred that a few public services might be 
"piggybacked" on the cable. 
This piggyback theory of cable development has 
Hobbesian roots. The world, particularly the· market 
place, it assumes, is an evil and precarious environment: 
The best that public policy can hope for is to impose 
certain limits on the cutthroat dynamics of human · 
economic affairs. Only occasionally is it possible to 
append aspects of a higher, more spiritual order on 
economic reality, such as art, or in the·case of television 
(high or minority) cultural programming. Beauty, in 
short, can at best punctuate everyday bestiality; it serves 
as a penance. 
What is overlooked in this formulation is the nature of 
modern corporate enterprise, which is constantly seeking 
ways to routinize its relationship with. ownership, 
government, consumers, labor, and other suppliers (i.e .. 
of capital, equipment, programming, etc.). In this 
complex of relationships there is usually enough "give"· 
for either government or consumer intervention to 
occur-where, that is, the need for such intervention is 
experienced strongly enough. Government's role in the 
development of our space and defense economies has 
been more than marginal. Similarly, consumer pressure 
for safety, ecology and mass transit is beginning to 
impact the transportation industry in more than a casual 
way. In sum, to say that growth in cable television must 
follow other, "naturai" laws is fable also. 
There is a second way in which the beauty/beast 
metaphor (apologies to Straparola and Cocteau) applies 
to the current cable TV dabate. It takes its lead from the 
relationship between the cable industry and conven-
tional TV broadcasting. In one corner is pictured not 
only an outdated technology but also a faulty manage-
ment team, censoring, unresponsive and generally 
declining. In the other corner are the cable system 
operators, venturesome, spotless upstarts each and every 
one. Yet the record (despite its relative brevity in the 
cable field) does not necessarily reflect this one-sided 
evaluation. The ex-chairman of the largest cable 
corporation was recently found guilty of bribing 
municipal officials in Johnstown, Pennsylvania, for 
franchising rights. Local origination programming on 
cable TV systems has for the most part been uninspired. 
And so forth. 
A variation on this last perspective is the belief that 
the growth of cable television is not likely to engender 
any serious negative consequences. For example, the 
Sloan report states on the impact on privacy: "We do 
not believe that these issues are as important with 
respect to cable television as with respect to the 
telephone and to data communications, where lines can 
be tapped with far more serious effects." Can they 
really? Again, the facts suggest that one could more 
easily tap an· entire network of homes over cable· 
television than over the phone system, especially as 
subscriber-response and computer-addressed services are 
initiated. Already cable system operators are rubbing 
their hands over the facility with which they will be able 
to determine secretly households' viewing preferences. 
Similarly, the Sloan report cites the example of how 
cable television came to Palm Springs, California. "At 
once," it reads, "for a few dollars a month the seven 
VHF channels and three UHF channels from Los 
Angeles were at the disposal of anyone in Palm Springs 
willing to pay the price." Since Palm Springs' television 
receivers are isolated from Los Angeles due to an 
intervening mountain range, the coming of cable can 
easily sound like technological nirvana. Yet what the 
Sloan Commission does not bother to report is that the 
franchise term of the Palm Springs cable system is fifty 
years, which leaves local citizens and government little 
leverage over how the system performs both now and in 
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Putting Humpty Together Again 
This leads us to the ultimate question, which is 
whether the development of cable television should be 
an important societal concern. And if so, how is this 
concern to be expressed through citizen and government 
action. 
Without being overly McLuhanesque, it is not 
unreasonable to suggest that the advent of cable 
television is in fact shattering our conventional, 
limited-channel image of television into a thousand 
pieces (or, to be more specific, about twenty-four). Like 
Humpty Dumpty, our broadcasting system is about to 
hit a hard reality, that of technological breakthrough 
and innovation. And it is unlikely that the transforma-
tion the medium will undergo as a result will not have 
profound ramifications on our social fabric, just as 
television has already affected family life, schooling, 
politics, the movie industry and int.ernational relations. 
What remains at issue is the extent to which this 
transformation must be clouded by fable. More 
specifically, can we apply a social development model to 
this new technological phenomenon or must we be 
subject solely to the traditional exigencies of hurried 
economic growth? 
If the former is to occur, three steps need to be taken. 
First, a process of disseminating information about cable 
television and of citizen participation in related policy 
decisions will have to be instituted. To date, inputs into 
cable policy have come almost exclusively from industry 
sources, think tanks, and other elites. The recently 
engineered "cable compromise" is a case in point. The 
Office of Telecommunications Policy limited its 
arbitration solely to private interests. With comparable 
circumscription, the Sloan Commission consulted 
establishment groups (private and public) almost 
exclusively in the preparation of its report. To repeat, a 
broader framework of discussion and decision must be 
created. 
A second major objective of cable policy in the 
context of what Alvin Toffler has called "anticipatory 
democracy" should be to improve our experimental and 
predictive capacities about cable technology. This 
means, for example, being able to project whether 
remote shopping will undermine the commercial and 
social interdependence (minimal as it already is) of our 
suburbs and central cities. It means evaluating which 
interactive television systems are most likely to improve 
198 home learning. And it also means testing alternative 
modes (financial and organizational) of local program 
production. It goes without saying that if this "research" 
activity is to fully complement the first objective of 
01verse citizen involvement, it should emanate from a 
variety of ~ources and not solely the think-tank confines 
of the Rand Corporation or Urban Institute. 
Finally, specific policy instruments should be applied 
in instances where the application of cable technology 
can clearly serve a public purpose. In the case of 
minority ownership of cable systems, for example, this 
means going beyond the suggestion that localities give a 
preference to minority franchise applicants. Such a 
suggestion (see the Sloan report) is meaningless unless 
supported by regulatory and financial mechanisms (e.g. 
government·guaranteed loans to community develop-
ment corporations). In the case of municipal and 
governmental services that might be improved through 
cable communications, it means not only reserving 
channel capacity but also providing the incentives for 
particular kinds of two-way systems to come into being. 
The overarching difficulty with regulation in the cable 
television area, as in many other areas, is that it tends to 
be both negative and protectionist. Rather than 
encouraging the fulfillment of communications 
objectives, it simply discourages the unmitigated pursuit 
of their opposites (as, for example, in cross-ownership 
limitations). And rather than attempting to meet 
consumer and public needs, it repeatedly protects 
industry interests, whether they be those of broad-
casters, cable system operators or copyright holders. 
Again, the cable "compromise agreement" can serve ·as 
the example. Instead of injecting a measure of positive 
public policy into a long-standing framework of 
protectionist regulation, the Office of Telecommunica-
tion Policy merely arbitrated the degree to which 
specific private interests were to be protected in the 
future. Ironically, the President's communications policy 
arm did not even represent the federal government in 
these deliberations nor, apparently, were any public 
service issues even discussed. Given this context, there is 
little hope that the development of cable television will 
be guided by any other process than a fable. 
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